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[Crim. No. 6450. In Bank. Dee. 1, 1959.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. VERON ATCHLEY,
Appellant.

o

[1] Criminal Law - Evidence - Documentary Evidence - Photogra.phs.-When allegedly gruesome photographs are presented,
the trial court iu the exercise of its judicial discretion must
decide whether their probative value outweighs their possible
prejudicial effect.
[2] Id.-Evidence-Documentary Evidllnce-Photographs.-The
trial court in an uxoricide case did not abuse its discretion
in admitting photographs showing the deceased as she was
found in her front yard, with bullet holes and bloodstains on
her dress and blood on her face, for the purpose of illustrating
testimony about her wounds and to show the relative positions
in which the body and various items of evidence were discovered, or in admitting other photographs showing the deceased lying on a table at the mortuary, naked above the waist,
with blood smeared on her face, for the purpose of showing
the location and nature of her wounds and to explain the basis
for expert opinions as to the position of the gun when the abots
were fired.
[3] Id.-Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Photogra.phs.-It was
within the discretion of the trial court in an uxoricide ease
to permit all pictures of the deceased taken by the same photographer to be identified at the same time, though many of them
were not to be used until later in the trial.
.
[4] Id.-Evidence-Declarations of Defendant-Voluntary Oharacter.-The necessity for determining the voluntary character
of a statement by defendant does not depend on whether it
constitutes a confession of guilt. This rule applies to a statement including an important incriminating fact.
[1] Bee Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 226; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 727.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 398; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 560.
McB:. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 522(1) ; [2,3] Criminal Law, § 522(5); [4, 6] Criminal Law, § 445; [5] Criminal Law,
§ 467; [7,8] Criminal Law, § 525.5; [9] Criminal Law, § 1382(21);
[10] Homicide, § 108 j [11] Criminal Law, § 271; Witnesses, § 247;
[12] Witnesses, § 247; [13] Witnesses, §§ 18, 96; [14] Criminal
Law, § 619; [15] Criminal Law, § 628; [16] Criminal Law, §§ 1285,
1404(19); [17, 19] Homicide, § 185; [18] Homicide, § 15(5); [~,
21] Homicide, § 58; [22] Homicide, § 265.
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[6] ld.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-Involuntary confessions are excluded because they are untrustworthy, because
it offends the community's sense of fair play and decency to
convict a defendant by evidence extorted from him, and because
exclusion serves to discourage the use of physical brutality and
other undue pressure!; in questioning those suspected of crime.
These reasons for excluding involuntary confessions apply
also to involuntary admissions.
[6] ld.-Evidence-Declarations of Defendant-Voluntary Character.-Any statement by an accused relative to the offense
charged is inadmissible against him if made linvoluntarily.
[7] ld.-Evidence-Sound Recordings.-The trial court in an uxoricide case did not err in admitting a tape recording of a conversation between defendant and his insurance broker, in the
interrogation room of the county jail, as against the objection
that the voluntary nature of defendant's statements was not
adequately shown, where the broker testified that no threats
were made, that no inducements were offered, and that in an
earlier conversation defendant had volunteered substantially
the same statements without being asked, where defendant
did not contradict this testimony or suggest that any of his
recorded statements were untrue, and where the recorded
conversation demonstrated that the broker referred to the
insurance policy to explain why he was asking questions and
not as an inducement for any particular answers.
[8] ld.-Evidence-Sound Recordings.-Mere deception used in
obtaining a tape recording of a conversation between defendant and his insurance broker did not render defendant's statements inadmissible where the deception was not of a type reasonable likely to procure an untrue statement.
[9] ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Error in sustaining
an objection to a question asked defendant's insurance broker
on cross-examination as to whether defendant had complained
,to the broker of not being permitted by the police to talk to
a lawyer did not result in prejudice where, though refusal to
permit defendant to talk to counsel suggested an intent to
coerce, it was highly improbable that either the trial judge or
the jury would have inferred coercion from such refusal alone
in the light of substantial and uncontradicted evidence that
no coercion occurred.
[10] Homicide-Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations of Deceased.The trial court in an uxoricide case did not err in permitting
the People to introduce on rebuttal a letter purportedly written
b~' the dee-eased to a judge two days before she was shot, in

[5] See CaLJur.2d, Evidence, § 422 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 482 et seq.
U C.J4-e
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which letter the deceased itemized alleged sales of used cars
made by defendant without a license, stated that defendant had
threatened to kill her and expressed her fear of him, where the
letter was admitted, with a limiting instruction, solely to show
the deceased's state of mind, not to show that defendant had
threatened her, and was therefore not objectionable as hearsay,
and where the letter tended to prove her fear of defendant,
which was relevant to defendant's claim that she was the aggressor in a struggle for the gun.
[11] Criminal Law - Compelling Production of Evidence: Witnesses - Impeachment - Testimony Impeachable. - The trial
court did not err in refusing to order the prosecution in an
uxoricide case to produce certain rent receipts and in admonishing the jury to disregard defense counsel's statement that
he would prove the receipts to be forgeries, as against the
assertion that defendant should have been permitted to use
the receipts to impeach the prosecution's witness who testified
on cross-examination that she had never forged a rent receipt
for the deceased and that she had seen the deceased pay rent
to defendant and defendant give receipts for it, where the
question whether rent receipts had been forged to deceive the
welfare authorities was collateral to the issues being tried,
where the trial court had discretion to foreclose further inquiry
along that line, even for purposes of impeachment, where defense counsel offered to show merely that the receipts were
forged by the prosecution's witness "or someone else," and
where such showing with regard to the particular receipts in
question might have been consistent with the witness' testimony
and its value as impeachment was therefore questionable.
[12] Witnesses-Impeachment-Testimony Impeacha.ble.-Where
defendant on direct examination in an uxoricide case testified
in detail as to the finances of his household, which had apparently given rise to numerous quarrels with the deceased, and
in particular stated that she had paid him no rent, and where
in a prior and unrelated criminal proceeding he had testified
that a certain check constituted payment of rent she owed
him, which testimony directly contradicted the statement made
by defendant on direct examination, it was within the discretion of the court to permit defendant to be questioned on crossexamination for purposes of impeachment as to his own prior
inconsistent statement.
[13] Id.-Mode of Testifying-lliustrating Testimony: Self-incrimina.tion-Waiver.-Where defendant testified on direct examination in an uxoricide ease that he had been carrying a
loaded pistol inside his beIt, that his shirttails were tucked
in 80 that the gun was plainly visible, that he had 8CUftled with
his wife for possession of the gun and that it had gone off
Cl~ the struggle, it was proper cross-examination to require
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him to put on the shirt he had worn on the night of the killing,
to show how he had carried the gun, and to demonstrate with
an assistant district attorney his and his wife's movements
during the alleged struggle, and he waived his privilege ngainst
!'elf·incrimination ns to thl'se mntters when he voluntarily
rai!'ed them on direet examination.
[14] Criminal Law-Argument of Counsel-Inferences From Evidence.-A suggestion by the prosecutor in his closing argument
in an uxoricide case that the deceased had been shot initially
in the back as she turned to run away was based on a reasonable interpretation of the evidence and was therefore within
the scope of permissible argument where, though there was
no evidence of the order in which the deceased received the
various wounds, there was evidence that a wound in her back
marked the entrance of a bullet, and where, from the position
in which the body was found and other evidence, it clearly
could be inferred that the deceased had turned to run.
[15] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Comment on Lack of Testimony.
-It was proper for the prosecutor in an uxoricide case to
argue that if the prosecution's eyewitnesses were unable to see
the killing from their bedroom window, as the defense had
suggested, defense counsel would have requested that the jury
view the premises, it being generally permissible to argue that
an adverse inference should be drawn from the opposing party's
faiiure to produce the strongest available evidence. Defense
counsel could have responded to such argument pointing out
that a countervailing inference could be drawn from the
prosecution's failure to request II view.
[16] Id.-Appeal-Presumptions-Jury: Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attomey.-Where the prosecutor in an
• uxoricide case misstated the law when he told the jury that
the killing of a human being while in the commission of a
felony, namely, assault with a deadly weapon, was :first degree
murder, but shortly thereafter corrected his error and apologized to the jury, and the court gave accurate instructions
on murder and its degrees and repeated those instructions at
the jury's request shortly before the verdict was returned, it
must be presumed that the jury followed the court's instructions and that defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's misstatement of the law.
[17] Homicide-Instructions-Degrees of Offense.-The instructions in an uxoricide case were not erroneous as permitting
the jury to convict defendant of first degree murder without
finding malice aforethought where the court clearly defined
murder in terms of malice aforethought, the next succeeding
instruction differentiated the finding of murder from tIle deI
~.
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termination of degree, and all instructions on lying in wait
expressly presupposed a finding of murder.
[18] ld.-Murder-Killing by Lying in Wait.-The elements necessary to constitute murder by lying in wait are watching,
waiting and concealment from the person killed with the intention -of inflicting bodily injury on such person or of killing
such person.
[19] ld.-Instructions--Murder-Killing by Lying in Wait.-There
was sufficient evidence in an uxoricide case to justify giving an
instruction on lying in wait where the testimony of one neighbor indicated that defendant waited behind his wife's house
for over an hour, where there were admissions by defendant
that he parked a block away to conceal his presence, that he
waited behind the house for about 25 minutes, that he was
watching for the headlights of his wife's car, and that he surprised her by stepping out "right into her face," and where
from the fact that he had armed himself with a loaded pistol
and the evidence indicating that he shot her almost immediately
on her arrival, the jury could reasonably conclude that he was
waiting for her with the intention of shooting her and that
the shooting was accomplished "by means of" his watching
and waiting in concealment.
[20] ld.-Evidence-Mental State.-Where defense counsel in his
offer of proof in an uxoricide case stated that proposed medical
testimony would bear on defendant's ability at the time of
trial to remember what had occurred, but there was no suggestion that it would bear on malice aforethought, premeditation or deliberation, the record did not show that evidence
relevant to these issues was excluded.
[21] ld.-Evidence-Mental State.-Where defendant in an uxoricide case offered to elicit a doctor's opinion as to whether,
in view of defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting and after his arrest, it would be "normal" for him not to
remember the details of the shooting or his statements to the
police, and also proposed to ask the doctor about the reflex
action of the trigger finger of a person under stress, the trial
court erred in ruling that the jury could evaluate these matters without the help of an expert, both the mental stress
created by involvement in a killing and the effect of such
stress on finger reflexes being sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier
of fact.
[22J ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Erroneous exclusion of medical testimony in an uxoricide case as to defendant's mental condition at the time of the shooting and after
his arrest did not result in a miscarriage of justice where,
though testimony as to reflexes of the trigger finger of a person j
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under stress might have made defendant's story of a struggle
more credible, there was abundant evidence inconsistent with
a struggle to sustain a conviction of first degree murder, including the distance from which the shots were apparently fired,
the proximity in which five empty cartridge casings were found,
the fact t~at defendant had armed himself and waited for his
wife, the cry heard by the neighbors, and the fact that virtually
every bullet in defendant's gun entered her body, where defendant was shown to have lied repeatedly to the police after
his arrest and to have lied under oath in a prior criminal proceeding, where the evidence inconsistent with defendant's story
of a struggle for the gun was abundant and convincing, and
where there was no reasonable probability that admission of
the excluded medical testimony would have persuaded the
jury to reach a different result.

(:J

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of Butte
County and from an order denying a new trial. A. B. Ware,
Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty, affirmed.
J. R. King, Jr., under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
, TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found defendant guilty of murder
in the first degree and fixed the penalty at death. The trial
court denied his motion for a new trial and sentenced him to
death. This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd.
(b).)
Defendant was born in 1917 and was reared in a mountainous community in eastern Tennessee. He attended school only
through the third grade and cannot read or write anything
except his name. Some time between 1943 and 1946 he moved
to California and worked in various localities as an agriculturallaborer and a welder. He first met the deceased, Marcella
Katherine (Farris) Atchley, when he was working near Fresno
in 1953. He saw her a number of times before he left the Fresno
area, and she bore a child that he claims is his. Defendant
eventually entered the used car business in Palermo, California. He bought several lots, built houses on them, and lived
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in one of the houses with Jewel Spoon, a woman who served.
as his secretary and bookkeeper. He met thc deceased again
in ]956 when she came to buy a uscd car. She returned frequently and after a series of fights with Jewel Spoon moved
into defendant's home with five of her children. Jewel retired
to a trailer behind the house and later left town. Defendant
and the deceased quarreled frequently, but late in 1957 they
took a trip and were married in Georgia. They did not publicize their marriage, hoping to avoid a reduction in the
aid that she and her children were receiving from the county
welfare department.
During the last few days of July, 1958, Mrs. Atchley and
her children moved out of defendant's home to a house in
Gridley, California. Although defendant assisted in making
the move, a quarrel ensued and Mrs. Atchley complained to the
police. Defendant then informed welfare personnel of her
marriage to him. She in turn informed the authorities that
defendant had been selling used cars without a license.
On the night of August 2, 1958, Mrs. Atchley went to a
dance at Robinson's Corners with her oldest daughter and a
young married couple. About 12 :15 a. m. she drove her
daughter home and then drove the young couple to their
home in Oroville.
Defendant spent that evening drinking beer with several
friends, but there is no evidence that he became drunk. Some
time after midnight he drove to his wife's house in Gridley
and discovered that she was not there. He drove back to
Palermo, looking for her at Robinson's Corners and at several taverns along the way. He then returned to Gridley
and drove by her house again. Noticing that her car was still
absent, he parked his car about a block away and took from
a glove compartment a 22-caliber pistol loaded with six or
seven bullets. He placed the pistol inside the belt of his
trousers and approached the house on foot through a back
alley. He then waited in the alley and in the back yard, where
he could see the headlights of his wife's car when she drove in.
About 2 :25 a. m. Mrs. Atchley drove up to the carport attached to one side of her house. While she was parking, defendant moved along the opposite side of the house and stood
by the front corner. Mrs. Atchley walked around to the front
gate and up the walk. As she neared the door, defendant
stepped out towards her. In the ensuing few minutes she was
shot once in the head, once in the left breast, three times under
the right arm, and, according to the prosecution's experts, once
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in the back. Her body was later found about 3 feet from the
front walk on the side opposite the point where defendant
had stepped out. She was lying face down with her feet
towards the walk and her head towards the carport.
Following the shooting defendant drove back to Palermo.
He buried the gun in his back yard and hid the holster in an
ash can: lIe then went to bed, where the police found him
about 4 a. m.
At the trial defendant conceded most of the foregoing facts
but maintained that he had been told that his wife was going
out with another man, that he had taken the gun only to
scare them, and that he had no intention of killing or injuring
his wife. He stated that when he saw her returning alone,
he stepped out to greet her; that his shirttails were tucked
in 80 that the gun inside his belt was clearly visible; that she
seized. the gun and he struggled to recover it; that the gun
went off several times during the struggle; and that after he
recovered it, he fired it several more times. The defense introduced much testimony that Mrs. Atchley had said she wished
to kill defendant, that she had threatened him with a gun on
several occasions, and that she was a violent and combative
person.
Two neighbors testified for the prosecution that they were
awakened by the voice of a woman crying hysterically, "Oh,
don't. don't," followed by a series of shots. Looking out their
bedroom window they saw defendant in a stooping position,
shooting towards the ground. Because an intervening fence
'obscured the body, they assumed that he was shooting at the
tires on Mrs. Atchley's car. They and another neighbor, who
saw defendant arrive and walk into the back alley, testified
that his shirttails were out. Defendant admitted at the trial
that the gun inside his belt would not have been visible had
his shirttails been out. To rebut defendant's story of a struggle
for the gun, the prosecution introduced evidence that all of
the shots were fired from such a distance that the deceased
could not have been holding the gun at the time, that Mrs.
Atchley was found with her keys still clutched in her right
hand, and that five empty cartridge casings were found so
close to each other as to indicate that the shots had been fired
with the gun in approximately the same position. Other evidence indicated that defendant had threatened his wife, that
she was afraid of him, and that most of the threats and all of
the acts of violence attributed to her occurred during the
period of her conflict with Jewel Spoon.
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Defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting certain evidence. He argues first
that certain photographs introduced by the prosecution werp.
gruesome in character, were unnecessary to the prosecution's
case, and were offered several days before they were to be used
by the expert witnesses, for the sole purpose of inflaming and
prejudicing the jury.
[1] When allegedly gruesome photographs are presented,
the trial court in the exercise of its judicial discretion must
decide whether their probative value outweighs their possible
prejudicial effect. (People v. Bmbaker, ante, pp. 37, 48
[346 P.2d 8]; People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 751 [312
P.2d 665] ; People v. Cheary, 48 Cal.2d 301, 312 [309 P.2d
431] .) [2] In the present case some of the challenged
photographs show the deceased as she was found in her front
yard, with bullet holes and bloodstains on her dress and blood
on her face. They were used to illustrate testimony about her
wounds and to show the relative positions in which the body
and various items of evidence were discovered. Other photographs show the deceased lying on a table at the mortuary,
naked above the waist, with blood smeared on her face. These
pictures were used to show the location and nature of her
wounds and to explain the basis for expert opinions as to the
position of the gun when the shots were fired. Although many
of these photographs are decidedly unpleasant to view, they
are not comparable to those held inadmissible in People v.
Redston, 139 Cal.App.2d 485, 490-491 [293 P.2d 880], or
People v. BU1'ns, 109 Cal.App.2d 524, 541-542 [241 P.2d 308,
242 P .2d 9], where the deceased was shown with a shaved head
and disfigured by an autopsy. In view of their probative
value, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
them. [3] It was also within the discretion of the trial court
to permit aU the pictures taken by the same photographer
to be identified at the same time, even though many of them
were not to be used until later in the trial.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of a tape recording of a conversation
between defendant and his insurance broker, Ray J. Travers.
The conversation took place in the interrogation room of the
county jail two days after defendant had been arrested and
before he had obtained a lawyer. Defendant was unaware
that his words were being recorded and did not know that
Travers had formerly been a police officer or that he had
agreed to question defendant so that the recording could be
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made. In response to Travers' questions defendant admitted
arming himself, concealing himself, watching and waiting for
his wife, surprising her, and firing several shots while the gun
was in his hand. He maintained however, that the shooting occurred during a struggle for the gun and that he had no intention of killing the deceased. Defendant contends that these recorded statements constitute a confession and that they were
made involuntarily because Travers held out as an inducement
the payment to Mrs. Atchley's children of the proceeds of an
insurance policy on her life. The People contend that defendant's recorded statements do not constitute a confession
and were therefore admissible even if involuntary.
There has been considerable confusion as to the admissibility
in a criminal proceeding of statements allegedly made by the
defendant involuntarily. (See People v. Idnden, 52 Ca1.2d
1, 29, footnote 8 [338 P.2d 397].) Many opinions distinguish
"confessions" and "admissions," and state that the latter
are admissible without regard to their involuntary character.
(E.g., People v. Ada.ms, 198 Cal. 454, 465 [245 P. 821] ; People
T. Powler,178 Cal. 657, 664-665 [174 P. 892] ; People v. Garcia,
124 Cal.App.2d 822, 825-826 [269 P.2d 673] ; People v. Trawick, 78 Cal.App:2d 604, 608 [178 P.2d 45] ; People v. Cummings, 7 Cal.App.2d 406, 408 [46 P.2d 778] ; see People v.
Wolfe,42 Ca1.2d 663, 670 [268 P.2d 475] ; People v. Ferdi'Mnd,
194 Cal. 555, 568-569 [229 P. 341].) The distinctions between
•confessions and admissions, however, are "subtle and questionable."1 (People v. Chessman, 52 Cal.2d 467, 493 [341 P.2d
679].) Moreover, a number of early cases suggest that even
admissions must be excluded if involuntary. (People v. Skem
Ak F'ook, 64 Cal. 380, 381, 382 [1 P. 347] ; People v. White,
47 Cal.App. 400, 401 [190 P. 821] ; People v. Harris, 45 Cal.
App. 547, 551 [188 P. 65] ; People v. Quan Gim Gow, 23 Cal.
'For example, in People v. Arnold, 108 Cal.App.2d 719 [239 P.2d H9],
the defendant was charged with murdering two men, Cavness and Green·
way. His statement to the police after his arrest that he shot Greenway
"because he saw me shoot Cavness" was characterized as a "statement
of hiI reason for shooting" and held to be an admission, not a confession.
In Peopu: v. Cryder, 90 Cal.App.2d 194 [202 P.2d 765], the defendant
made an allegedly coerced confession to robbery and a subsequent lltate·
ment, alllO allegedly coerced, that his confession was in the main correct.
The latter statement was held not to be a confession. In People v.
CrOfl.ellitch, 86 Cal.App. 646 r261 P. 309], the defendant was charged
with burglarizing eertain hotel rooms. After he was arrested and lIome
of the stolen property found in his possession, he was asked when he had
entered the rooms. Bis reply that •• all the rooms were entered betw_
two and four o'clock, as people were 80nnd asleep at that time" ....
Ul4 aot to be a confession.
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App. 507, 510-512 [138 P. 918].) [4] More recently, this court
has stated that "the necessity for determining thc voluntary
character of the statement does not depend upon whether or
not it constitutes a confession of guilt." (People v. Nagle,
25 Ca1.2d 216, 222-223 [153 P.2d 344] ; sce People v. Gonzales,
24 Ca1.2d 870, 874-875 [151 P.2d 251].) We have required
preliminary proof of the voluntary character of statements
that include "an important incriminating fact." (People v.
Nagle, supra; see People v. Eggers, 30 Ca1.2d 676, 689 [185
P.2d 1] ; People v. Quan aim Gow, 23 Cal.App. 507, 512 [138
P. 918].) Limitation of the exclusionary rule to full confessions has been rejected not only by the foregoing opinions
of this court (People v. Eggers, supra; People v. Nagle, supra;
People v. Gonzales, sttpra), but also by the American Law
Institute (Model Code of Evidence rule 505) and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Uniform Rule of Evidence 63 (6); see also 78 A.B.A. Rep. 134).
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires exclusion of coerced admissions if they are sufficiEmtly
damaging. (Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 [66 S.Ot.
544,90 L.Ed. 667]; but cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156,
162-163, footnote 5 [73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522].)
[ 5 ] Involuntary confessions are excluded because they
are untrustworthy, because it offends "the community's sense
of fair play and decency" to convict a defendant by evidence
extorted from him, and because exclusion serves to discourage
the use of physical brutality and other undue pressures in
questioning those suspected of crime. (People v. Berve, 51 Cal.
2d 286, 290, 293 [332 P.2d 97] ; see Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 54 [69 S.Ct. 1347, 1357, 93 L.Nd. 1801]; Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 [64 S.Ot. 1208, 88 L.Ed. 1481].)
All these reasons for excluding involuntary confessions apply
to involuntary admissions as well. (See Opper v. United States,
348 U.S. 84, 90-92 [75 8.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101] ; Falknor, The
Hearsay Rule and Its Excepiifms, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 43, 68.)
[6] Accordingly, any statement by an accused relative to
the offense charged is inadmissible against him if made involuntarily.
[7] The People contend, however, that the voluntary
nature of defendant's statements was adequately shown before
the recording was admitted into evidence. Travers testified
that no threats were made, that no inducements were offered,
and that in an earlier conversation defendant had volunteered

Dec. 1959]

PEOPLE V. ATCHLEY
153 C.2d 160; 346 P.2<i 764]

()

171

substantially the same statements without· being asked. Defendant at no ~ime contradicted this testimony or suggested
that any of his recorded statements were -tmtrue. Moreover,
the recorded conversation demonstrates that Travers referred
to the insurance policy to explain why he' was asking questions and not as an inducement for any particular answers.
The trial court listened to the tape in chambers before ruling
on its admissibility. There is therefore no merit in defendant's
contention that the recording was admitted without a proper
showing that his statements were made voluntarily.
Defendant also contends that the recording was obtained
by such fraud that its use as evidence was inconsistent with
due process. He relies primarily on Leyra v. D('Inno, 347 U.S.
556 [74 8.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed 948]. In that c~ the police, having
promised a suspect medical treatment for ~n acutely painful
attack of sinus, introduced as the "doctor:" a highly skilled
psychiatrist with a considerable knowledge of hypnosis. The
psychiatrist used threats, promises of leniency, and expressions
of sympathy to reduce the physically exhausted suspect to
almost trance-like submission. Use of his resulting confessions
violated due process, largely because they were the product
of "mental coercion." [8] Although there was" a similar
• deception in the present case, there was no comparable mental
coercion. The deception itself does not render defendant's
statements inadmissible, for it was not of a type reasonably
likely to procure an untrue statement. (People v. Connelly,
195 Cal. 584, 597 [234 P. 374] ; People v. CasteUo, 194 Cal.
595,602 [229 P. 855].)
[ 9 ] While cross-examining Travers as to the voluntariness
of defendant's recorded statements, defense counsel attempted
to ask whether defendant had complained to Travers of not
being permitted by the police, despite numerous requests, to
talk to a lawyer. The trial court sustained an objection to this
question and explained to the jury that the answer would have
no bearing on the question of voluntariness. Defendant correctly contends that this ruling was erroneous, but fails to
show that it was prejudicial. Although a refusal to permit
defendant to talk to counsel suggests an intent to coerce, it
seems highly improbable that either the trial judge or the
jury would have inferred coercion from such a refusal alone
in the light of the substantial and uncontradicted evidence
that no coercion occurred.
[10] Defendant contends that the trial court «rcd in
lpermitting the People to introduce on rebuttal a letter pur-;
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portedly written by the deceased to Judge Savage two days
before she was killed. The letter itemized alleged sales of 1UIed
cars made by defendant without a license, stated that defendant had threatened the deceased, and expressed her fear of
him. Defendant contends that the introduction of this letter
on rebuttal was prejudicial because he was unfairly surprised late in the trial and because several prosecution witnesses who could have been examined with regard to the
letter and its contents had been finally discharged and could
be recalled by defendant only as his own witnesses. The
letter was admitted, however, with a limiting instruction,
solely to show the deceased's state of mind and not to show
that defendant had threatened her. It was therefore not
objectionable as hearsay. (People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776,
784-785 [306 P.2d 480] ; Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 255-259
[193 P. 251].) It tended to prove her fear of defendant,
which was relevant to defendant's claim that she was the
aggressor in a struggle for the gun. Since the claim of selfdefense was raised as part of the defendant's case, the letter
was admissible in rebuttal.
[11] Defendant contends that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in refusing to order the prosecution to produce certain rent receipts and in admonishing the jury to
disregard defense counsel's statement that he would prove
the receipts to be forgeries. Defendant asserts that he should
have been permitted to use the receipts to impeach the prosecution's witness, Barbara Farris, who testified on crossexamination that she had never forged a rent receipt for the
deceased and that she had seen the deceased pay rent to
defendant and defendant give receipts for it. The question
whether rent receipts had been forged to deceive the welfare
authorities was clearly collateral to the issues being tried.
The trial court had discretion to foreclose further inquiry
along that line, even for purposes of impeachment. (See Witkin, California Evidence, § 673.) Moreover, in support of his
request for the receipts, defense counsel offered to show merely
that they were forged by Barbara "or someone else." Such
a showing with regard to the particular receipts in question
might well have been consistent with Barbara's testimony. Its
value as impeachment, therefore, was questionable.
[12 ] Defendant also contends that the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecution to cross-examine him improperly. The assistant district attorney asked him whether
or not he had told the truth while testifying under oath in a
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prior and unrelated criminal proceeding. D;efendant argues
that this questioning was not proper impea~hment and was
beyond the scope of matters raised on his exan;..ination in chief.
(See Pen. Code, § 1323.) On direct examijlation, however,
defendant testified in detail as to the finances of his household, which had apparently given rise to numerous quarrels
with the deceased. In particular, he stated that she had paid
him no rent. In the prior proceeding he ha<J. testified that a
certain check constituted payment of rent she owed him. This
testimony directly contradicted the statem~t made by defendant on direct examination. Even though the matter was
collateral to the issues being tried, the trial court had discretion to permit the defendant to be qu~tioned for purposes of impeachment as to his own prior inconsistent statement. (See Witkin, California Evidence, § 673.)
[13] Defendant was also asked on cross-examination to
demonstrate certain aspects of his alleged struggle with his
wife. He argues that this demonstration violated his privilege
against self-incrimination and that it was ~ot proper crossexamination because not restricted to matters about which he
was examined in chief. Defendant testified on direct examination that he had been carrying a loaded! pistol inside his
belt, that his shirttails were tucked in so that the gun was
plainly visible, that he had scuffied with his wife for possession of the gun, and that it had gone off during the struggle.
On cross-examination he was required to put on the shirt he
had worn on the night of the killing, to show how he had
carried the gun, and to demonstrate with an assistant district attorney his and his wife's movements during the alleged
struggle. These matters were clearly raised by his direct
testimony. He was also asked how long his wife's arms were,
and replied that they were about the same length as his own.
He was then asked to hold the gun at arm's length pointed
towards himself with a finger touching the trigger. The distance from the muzzle to his body was measured and found
to be 10 inches. This part of the demonstration, in combination with the testimony of the prosecution's experts that the
gun was fired from at least 24 inches away, was directly related to defendant's statement on direet examination that the
gun had gone off while he and his wife were struggling for
it. The entire demonstration, therefore, was within the scope
of permissible cross-examination (Pen. Code, § 1323; People
v. Ortiz, 66 Cal.App. 154, 156 [225 P. 462]), and defendant
waived his privilege against self-incrimination as to the mat-
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ters involved wIlen he voluntarily raised them on direct examination. (People v. ATrighilli, 122 Cal. 121, 126 [54 P. 591] ;
People v. GaUagher, 100 Cal. 466, 474-476 [35 P. 80] ; People
v. Withers,73 Cal.App.2d 58, 60-61 [165 P.2d 945].)
[14] Defendant contend" that the prosecution wa!; guilty
of prejudicial misconduct in its closing argument. TIH' assistant district attorney suggested to the jury that the deceased
had been shot initially in the back as she turned to run away.
Defendant complains that this suggestion was based on facts
not in evidence. There was evidence that a wound in the
deceased's back marked the entrance of a bullet. From the
position in which the body was found and other evidence, it
clearly could be inferred that the deceased had turned to run.
Although there was no evidence of the order in which she
received the various wounds, the assistant district attorney's
suggestion was nonetheless based on a reasonable interpretation of the evidence, and was therefore within the scope of
permissible argument. (People v. Oheary,48 Ca1.2d 301, 317318 [309 P.2d 431] ; People v. BUI"U'ell, 44 Ca1.2d 16, 39-40
[279 P.2d 744].)
[15] The assistant district attorney also argued to the
jury that if the prosecution's t'yewitnesses were unable to see·
the killing from their bedroom window, as the defense had
suggested, defense counsel would have requested that the jury
view the premises. The basis for defendant's objection to this
argument is not clear. It is generally permissible to argue to
the jury that an adverse inference should be drawn from the
opposing party's failure to produce the strongest available
evidence. (Of. Pen. Codt', § 1323.) l\Iorevt'r, Mfensc counsel
had ample opportunity to respond to the argument or to
point out that a countervailing infrrenee could be drawn from
the prosecution's failure to request a view.
[ 16] The assistant district attorney misstated the law,
however, when he told the jury that the killing of a human
being while in the commission of a felony, to wit, assault with
a deadly weapon, is murder of the first degree. (See Pen.
Code, § 189.) Shortly thereafter he corrected his error and
apologized to the jury. The court gave accurate instructions
on murder and its degrees, and repeated those instructions
at the jury's request shortly before the verdict was returned.
It must be presumed that the jury followed the court's instructions and that defendant was not prejudiced by the assistant district attorney's earlier misstatement of the law.
[17] The trial court instructed tht' jury that murder is in
the first degree if perpetrated by lying in wait. (Pen. Code,
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§ 189.) Defendant contends that the court's instructions
were erroneous in that they permitted the jury to convict defendant of murder in the first degree without finding malice
aforethought. The court, however, clearly defined murder in
terms of malice aforethought. 2 The next succeeding instruction differentiated the finding of murder from the determination of degree. s All instructions on lying in wait expressly
presupposed a finding of murder.4 Defendant's contention
is therefore without merit.
Defendant also contends that there was insufficient evidence
to justify giving an instruction on lying in wait. [ 18 ] The
elements necessary to constitute lying in wait are watching,
waiting, and concealment from the person killed with the intention of inflicting bodily injury upon such person or of
killin~ such person.
(People v. Thomas, 41 Ca1.2d 470, 473
[261 P.2d 1].) [19] The testimony of one neighbor indi-

C)

·"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
"Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is
manifested a deliberate intentiou unlawfully to take away the life of a
fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears,
or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart.
"Malice aforethougllt, either express or implied, is manifested by the
doing of an unlawful and felonious act intentionally, deliberately, and
witllout legal cause or excuse. It does not imply a pre'existing hatred
or enmity toward the indh'idual injured."
·":M:urder is classified into two degrees, and if you should find the
defendant guilty of murder, it will be your duty to determine the
degree of the offense, whether first or second."
." All murder which is perpetrated by means of lying in wait, or by
any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder
of the first degree, and all other kinds of murder are of the second
degree."
'I All murder which is perpetrated by means of lying in wait is murder
of the first degree.
"To constitute lying in wait, as the term is used in tilese instructions,
a person's conduct must involve an intent to take another person unawares
so as to do him bodily injury, and must include, as a means to that end, a
waiting and watching for an opportune time to do t.he act, and also either
a concealment in ambush or some other secrecy of design to take tIle
other person by surprise.
"Lying in wait does not require any particular position of the body,
or that the designing person refrain from moving about, or that he entice
or trap the object of his design into any strange or puzzling situation,
or that the lying in wait continue for any particular period of time, provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent
to premeditntion and dt']iJ.)('ra~ ion."
"When the killing of a Illlm:m being amounts to murder and is ac·
complished by lying in wait, it is murder of the first degree even though
there did not exist in the mind of the slayer the specific intent to kill,
but it is necessary that there be the intentional inflicting of bodily injury
upon the person killed under circumstances likely to cause his death."
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cated that defendant waited behind his wife's house for over
an hour. The evidence included admissions by defendant that
he parked a block away to conceal his presence, that he waited
behind the house for about 25 minutes, that he was watching
for the headlights of his wife's car, and that he surprised her
by stepping out" right into her face." From the fact that he
had armed himself with a loaded pistol and the evidence indicating that he shot her almost immediately upon her arrival,
the jury could reasonably conclude that he was waiting for
her with the intention of shooting her and that the shooting
was accomplished "by means of" his watching and waiting in
concealment. There was therefore sufficient evidence to justify
giving the instruction.
[20] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
excluding certain medical testimony as to defendant's mental
condition at the time of the shooting. He relies on People v.
Wells, 33 Ca1.2d 330 [202 P.2d 53], which holds that medical
testimony as to mental state is admissible to show lack of
malice aforethought or lack of premeditation and deliberation. In his offer of proof, however, defense counsel stated
that the proposed testimony would bear on defendant's ability
at the time of the trial to remember what had occurred. There
was no suggestion that it would bear on malice aforethought,
premeditation, or deliberation. (Cf. People v. Wells, supra,
at 345.) The record does not show, therefore, that evidence
relevant to these issues was excluded.
[21] Defendant did offer to elicit the doctor's opinion
as to whether, in view of defendant's state of mind at tbe
time of the sbooting and after bis arrest, it would be "normal"
for him not to remember tbe details of tbe sbooting or his
statements to tbe police. He also proposed to ask the doctor
about tbe reflex action of tbe trigger finger of a person under
stress. The trial court ruled that the jury could evaluate
these matters without tbe help of an expert. Both the mental
stress created by involvement in a killing and the effect of
such stress on finger reflexes, bowever, were "sufficiently beyond common experience tbat tIle opinion of an expert would
assist the trier of fact." (People v. Colc, 47 Ca1.2d 99, 103
[301 P.2d 854, 56 A.L.R.2d 1435] ; George v. Bekins Van ct
Storage Co., 33 Ca1.2d 834, 844 [205 P.2d 10371.) As to both
matters, therefore, tbe trial court's ruling was erroneous.
The erroneously excluded evidence was significant because
defendant relied primarily on the theory tbat tbe shooting
was accidental or in self-defense. Since no other witness ob-
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served the first shots, it was critical whether the jury believed
his story of a struggle for the gun. The proposed testimony
as to reflexes might have served to render that story more
credible by providing an explanation of why so many shots
were fired and why defendant continued to shoot after recovering possession of the gun. The proposed testimony as
to defendant 's inability to remember might have served to
make defendant appear more truthful by rebutting the prosecution's suggestion that he was lying about his memory.'
[22] Upon examination of all the evidence, however, it
does not appear that the erroneous exclusion of this medical
testimony resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (See Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 4%.) Although the testimony as to reflexes
might have made defendant's story of a struggle more credible,
there was abundant evidence inconsistent with a struggle,
including the distance from which the shots were apparently
fired, the proximity in which the five empty cartridge casings
were found, the fact that defendant had armed himself and
waited for his wife, the cry heard by the neighbors, and the
fact that virtually every bullet in defendant's gun entered
her body. Although the testimony as to defendant's inability
to remember might have met one line of attack on his credibility, other lines of attack were given far more emphasis by
the prosecution. Defendant was shown to have lied repeatedly
to the police after his arrest and to have lied under oath in a
prior criminal proceeding. Moreover, his credibility was important primarily as it affected the jury's belief in his story
of a struggle for the gun. The evidence inconsistent with that
story was abundant and convincing. There is therefore no
reasonable probability that admission of the excluded medical
testimony would have persuaded the jury to reach a different
result. (See PeopZe v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818,836 [299 P.2d
243].)
The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed.
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Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J., Peters, J.,
and White, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
30,1959.
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